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Abstract: 
Purpose –  
This paper aims to investigate how the implementation of the inter-cooperation principle 
among Spanish machine-tool cooperatives helps them to coopete–collaborate with 
competitors, in their innovation and internationalization processes and achieve collaborative 
advantages. 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses a multi-case approach based on interviews 
with 15 CEOs and research and development (R&D) managers, representing 14 Spanish 
machine tool firms and institutions. Eight of these organizations are worker-cooperatives.. 
Findings – Worker -cooperatives achieve advantages on innovation and internationalization 
via inter-cooperation (shared R&D units, joint sales offices, joint after-sale services, 
knowledge exchange and relocation of key R&D technicians and managers). Several mutual 
bonds and ties among cooperatives help to overcome the risk of opportunistic behaviour and 
knowledge leakage associated to coopetition. The obtained results give some clues explaining 
to what extent and under which conditions coopetitive strategies of cooperatives are 
transferable to other types of ownership arrangements across sectors. 
Practical implications – Firms seeking cooperation with competitors in their R&D and 
internationalization processes can learn from the coopetitive arrangements analyzed in the 
paper.  
Social implications – Findings can be valuable for sectoral associations and public bodies 
trying to promote coopetition and alliances between competitors as a means to benefit from 
collaborative advantages. 
Originality/value – Focusing on an “ideal type” of co-operation -cooperative organisations- 
and having access to primary sources, the paper shows to what extent (and how) strong 
coopetitive structures and processes foster innovation and internationalization.     
 
Keywords: Coopetition, Cooperation, Competition, Cooperatives, Innovation, 
Internationalization.  
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1.- Introduction  
Coopetition can be briefly defined as simultaneous cooperation and competition at multiple 
levels, be these dyadic, triadic, network levels or even at an intra-organizational level (Raza-
Ullah et al. 2014, Bentsson and Raza-Ullah 2016). Coined by Ray Noorda, former CEO of 
Novell, and popularized by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996), coopetition has seen 
increased academic attention in recent decades. 
Coopetition is more critical in high technology and knowledge intensive and dynamic 
industries, given their short product life-cycles, need of high R&D investments, convergence 
of multiple technologies and importance of technological standards (Garud, 1994; Gnyawali 
and Park, 2009, 2011). As a consequence, empirical quantitative research has focused on 
industries as biotechnology (Quintana and Benavides, 2004), IT (Boucken and Kraus, 2013), 
wireless communication (Yami and Nemeh, 2014) or medical devices and machinery 
(Bouncken et al. 2017). Similarly, seminal qualitative case studies also focus on firms 
operating in those industries, normally big multinationals that have been successful at 
developing coopetitive arrangements, as Samsung and Sony (Gnyawali and Park, 2011), 
Amazon (Ritala et al. 2014), Toyota and GM; Renault and Nissan (Segrestin, 2005); Toyota, 
Peugeot and Citroen (Gwyne, 2009); Apple and Nike; HP, IBM and Seagate; big airline 
alliances such as “Star Alliance” or “One World” (Bouncken et al. 2015, Gast et al. 2015).  
Inspired by these successes, firms in many industries have launched coopetitive initiatives 
and structures –strategic alliances, networks, clusters and other associations–. Actors 
promoting such coopetitive initiatives consider that cooperating competitors can obtain 
advantages sharing technological resources, innovative capabilities and risks (Bengtsson and 
Kock, 2000; Paluda and Dagnino, 2007). An increasing number of scholars have found a 
positive relationship between coopetition and innovation outcomes (Tether, 2002: Quintana 
and Benavides, 2004; Nieto and Santamaría, 2007; Gnyawali and Park, 2009; Bouncken and 
Kraus, 2013; Park et al. 2014; Ritala 2012; Ritala and Huerlinga-Laukkanen, 2009, 2013; 
Yami and Nemeh, 2014; Wu, 2014). However, despite its potential advantages, coopetition 
also creates incentives for firms to behave opportunistically. The risks of opportunism and 
knowledge leakage inhibit many firms from engaging in coopetitive innovation and threatens 
the success of ongoing coopetitive projects (Baumard, 2009; Bouncken and Kraus, 2013; 
Bouncken and Fredrich, 2016). As a result, coopetition is described as a “double-edged 
sword” (Bouncken and Friedrich, 2012).  
Regardless of worldwide known coopetitive examples and the rapidly growing number of 
scientific publications (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014), scholars agree on the fact that 
coopetition as a research field is still in its infancy. Some research avenues, such as the 
relationship between coopetition and innovation, have not been explored enough yet (Ritala 
et al. 2016). The success of coopetitive arrangements for innovation depends highly on the 
type of innovation and the kind of firms being considered. Thus, research has been 
increasingly focused on finding how factors as firm size affect the adoption and effectiveness 
of coopetitive innovation. Yet, many other factors as differences in ownership and legal form 
have not been studied.  
This paper will focus on the long-standing and rich cooperation experience between 
cooperative firms. “Co-operation among Co-operatives” is one of the seven principles of the 
International Co-operative Alliance. According to it, “Co-operatives serve their members 
most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement by working together through 
local, national, regional and international structures” (United Nations 2012, 6th Principle, 
International Cooperative Alliance 2015). To the best of our knowledge no academic research 
has been conducted to know how worker-cooperatives implement this principle in practice to 
innovate through coopetition and overcome the risk of opportunistic behaviour. 
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Understanding coopetitive innovation practices and structures of worker-cooperatives can be 
useful for other firms willing to improve their innovation and competitive capabilities 
through coopetition.   
The study on coopetition comparing worker-cooperatives and investor owned firms in the 
case of the Spanish machine tool (MT) industry offers an interesting context for two main 
reasons. Firstly, coopetitive strategies have been largely fostered by both the European and 
the Spanish Association of Manufacturers of Machine Tools and by different public bodies. 
Precisely, some of the insight gained from our research questions tests the strength of these 
policies and arrangements against the risks and disadvantages, as perceived by firms. 
Secondly, within the MT industry there is a significant number of worker-cooperatives (13%) 
that are very prominent on innovation (they concentrate 38% of patents in the industry), 
something that distinguishes the Spanish setting from other countries (Otero 2010). Most 
Spanish MT worker-cooperatives belong to the Mondragon group, a secondary cooperative 
(International Co-operative Alliance, 2015), with strong inter-cooperation arrangements. If 
coopetition may offer “a broader, more complex view of cooperation that acknowledges the 
intrusion of competitive issues in the effort to reach a collaborative advantage” (Padula and 
Dagnino 2007:33), then it is our expectation that the set of positive and negative conditioning 
factors, pushing agents towards collaboration or competition, will be particularly noticeable 
under the context of the here studied sample.   
In the present research, we investigate how the implementation of the inter-cooperation 
principle among Spanish MT worker-cooperatives helps them to achieve advantages in their 
innovation and internationalization processes. What benefits do worker-cooperatives obtain 
from coopetition? How do worker-cooperatives materialize coopetition? How do they avoid 
the risks of opportunistic behaviour associated to coopetition? Are coopetitive practices of 
worker-cooperatives transferable to other types of organizations? These are the questions this 
paper tries to answer. 
To answer these questions, this study, in addition to a rigorous revision of the 
literature,collects evidence from fifteen in-depth semi-structured interviews with CEOs and 
Research and Development (R&D) managers of Spanish machine-tool producing firms, eight 
of which were worker cooperatives.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the literatures on coopetitive 
innovation and intercooperation. This is followed by an outline of the research method used 
in the project reported here, including a brief profile of the cases. The subsequent section 
summarizes the results of the field-work. The final section is devoted to discussion and 
conclusions. 
 
2.- Coopetition, inter-cooperation and innovation  
Coopetition poses a paradox in the form of a simultaneous pursuit of cooperation and 
competition between firms, and tensions developing at individual, organizational and inter-
organizational levels (Raza-Ullah et al. 2014). Past research recognizes a vast array of drivers 
of coopetition. These can be grouped in three broad types: internal or agent-based, external or 
environment-based, and relationship-based (Bengtsson and Raza-Ullah 2016). We discuss 
each in detail. 
   
2.1.- Internal drivers pushing towards or against coopetition 
The combination of quantitative research focused on industries with great potential for 
positive outcomes of coopetition and purposefully-selected success stories has the 
consequence of a literature framework with a “collaborative bias” (Padula and Dagnino, 
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2007). As Tether (2002) suggests, cooperative arrangements with competitors are far from 
the norm and much less common in the general population of firms than in the samples of 
many research studies on coopetition. 
While many researchers stress the positive effects of coopetition, it is also “fraught with 
difficulties in the sense that opportunism, misunderstandings and spillovers can hamper the 
positive impact of coopetition on performance and innovation” (Bouncken et al, 2015, 590). 
Formal means to protect prior knowledge, such as patents, exist (Teece 2000), although 
monitoring and enforcing tends to be expensive, and thus more difficult for SMEs (Schiessler 
2015). In some cases, the concurrence of both trust and non-disclosure agreements help to 
balance the dilemma between knowledge sharing and knowledge protection (Nguyen and 
Nafula 2016). On the side of factors playing against knowledge sharing is perceived risk of 
opportunism from other agents or merely the prospect of losing control of specific knowledge 
when this was externally produced for the firm. Thus, based on these ideas, we pose two 
research propositions:  
RP1: Participation by a firm in coopetitive initiatives is reduced due to risk aversion to: (a) 
the opportunistic transmission of own knowledge and (b) The diffusion to competitors 
of valuable knowledge externally produced on behalf of it. 
Coopetition provides a means for successful knowledge exchange, absorption and integration 
and, as a result, supports the generation of innovation, new knowledge and products 
(Bouncken and Kraus, 2013; Bouncken et al. 2015; Quintana and Benavides, 2004; Ritala 
and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009, 2013). However, proneness from competing agents to 
cooperate might differ depending on their knowledge absorptive and appropriability 
capacities. Firms with greater abilities to acquire knowledge from external sources and to 
protect their knowledge against imitation obtain greater innovation outcomes from 
coopetition (Ritala and Huermelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). However, if the company perceives 
that it alone is capable of individually generating the knowledge it needs, it will be more 
reluctant to cooperate. Thus, our following research propositions are: 
 
RP2: An agent’s propensity to coopete in a joint-development of knowledge will: (a) increase 
if it perceives that it can absorb knowledge fromexternal sources, (b) increase if it 
perceives that it can protect its own knowledge from competitors and (c) decrease if it 
perceives that it can concentrate on its own capabilities to generate relevant knowledge 
individually. 
 
 
However, given the threats of opportunistic behaviour, the degree of collaboration and 
competition in coopetitive arrangements differs over time in the production process. It has 
been argued that firms are more likely to cooperate in activities residing far from the 
customer, and compete in activities that are closer (Bergtsson and Kock, 1999, 2000; 
Osarenkhoe, 2010). However, the coopetition picture is more complex, as firms tend to 
simultaneously compete in some activities and collaborate in others (Bengtsson and Raza-
Ullah 2016).  
Additionally to the relevance of the activities subject to collaborative efforts between 
competitors, compared sizes of the firms coming into play, may also account for a relevant 
aspect. Despite the prevalence of case studies in large firms (Gnyawali, He & Madhavan, 
2006; Gnyawali and Park, 2011: Ritala et al. 2014), most researchers consider that positive 
outcomes of coopetition are potentially greater among small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). SMEs lack resources to pursue large-scale, risky R&D and innovation projects 
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(Gnyawaly and Park, 2009; Gomes-Casseres, 1997). A growing number of researchers 
suggest that SMEs collaborating with competitors can leverage resources together, achieve 
economies of scale, mitigate risks and reduce duplications (Bouncken and Kraus, 2013; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1997; Gnyawaly and Park, 2009; Morris, Koçak and Özer, 2007). SMEs 
can compete more effectively against larger players if they collaborate with other competitors 
and acquire and use knowledge and other relevant resources held by each other (Gnyawaly 
and Park, 2009). Competitors have high market commonality and resource similarity, are 
likely to face similar challenges, have common interests in developing certain technologies 
and possess resources and capabilities that are directly relevant or applicable for each other 
(Gnyawaly and Park 2009). Additionally, a mutual understanding of each party’s interrelated 
position can give rise to harmony between them (Bengtsson and Koch 1999). In this situation 
of firms of similar size and culture, sharing the same ‘industry recipe’, operating in a same 
industry, and even closely located, there will be a better understanding of the other agents’ 
dominant logic (as defined from Prahalad and Betis 1986). Hence, drawing on these ideas, 
and particularly, subscribing a research proposition original from Padula and Dagnino (2007), 
we pose: 
 
RP3: The higher the distance in the dominant logic between the competing agents, the higher 
the intrusion of the competitive issues into a cooperative relationship.   
 
2.2.- External drivers pushing towards coopetition in the MT industry 
Not only agents’ characteristics, but very markedly, factors from the environment heavily 
condition their decisions towards collaboration or competition. Past research analyzed the 
effects such as industry structure and growth level (Chen, 2009) or uncertainty and instability 
in the industry (Padula and Dagnino 2007, Ritala 2012).  
Some peculiarities of the MT industry markedly illustrate these conditioning effects:  
First, customers are the main source of innovation in the MT industry (Carlsson, 1995; 
Charterina et al. 2016, 2017; Chen, 2009; Lissoni, 2001, Lissoni and Pagani, 2003; 
Mazzoleni, 1997, 1999; Otero, 2010). A growing problem for many SMEs in the European 
MT industry is that an increasing share of the customers that purchase MTs is in far, distant 
markets. As a consequence, small and medium MT firms face problems to directly interact 
with buyers, exchange information and knowledge with them and provide them a proper 
innovative product and good after-sale service all over the world.  
Second, following the trend of Western European MT firms (Larsson and Malmberg, 1999; 
Wengel and Shapira, 2004), nowadays Spanish MT firms are producers of highly-customized 
equipment, that sell on demand, and adapt their production to the specifications requested by 
each customer (Charterina et al. 2017). Besides being the source of innovative ideas, user-
producer interactions are a fundamental aspect of business transactions for European MT 
firms, as engineering services are bundled with the sale of the equipment (Mazzoleni, 1999). 
Buying a MT involves a high degree of uncertainty and requires a lengthy buyer-supplier 
interaction (Larsson and Malmberg, 1999). As a consequence, sales and after-sale processes 
often require direct and time-consuming interaction of highly qualified salespeople, engineers 
and technicians with the buyers. Again, this direct interaction is more problematic for SMEs 
when buyers are geographically further and more globally dispersed. The European 
Association of Machine Tool Industries is concerned that European SMEs lack the capacity 
to expand to the growing Asian markets (CECIMO, 2011, 42). In order to make access to 
foreign and distant customers easier for SMEs and enhance their competitiveness, a 
coopetitive approach for European SMEs in the sense of forming alliances and going on the 
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international market together has been proposed (CECIMO, 2011, 45). Sadly, the same 
association observes “a low propensity of small-sized machine tool builders to cooperate and 
build partnerships” (CECIMO, 2011, 26), mainly because of Intellectual Property Right (IPR) 
concerns.  
From the account on these environmental effects, we pose: 
 
RP4a: The more vulnerable a firm is in terms of size or limited resources, the more it is 
willing to collaborate with a competitor.  
 
RP4b: Non-vulnerable or capable firms do not tend to take part in collaboration schemes with 
competitors.  
 
2.3.- Relational drivers among competing firms in the case of Mondragon’s MT co-
operative firms 
Most relevant Spanish MT worker-cooperatives voluntarily belong to the Mondragon 
Corporation, a highly diversified business group conformed in 2017 by 98 cooperatives, 143 
subsidiaries, 80818 employees and a turnover of €11936 million. Mondragon differs from 
ordinary corporations since power, authority and ownership is not centralized. Instead, the 
corporation has a “federal” or “inverted pyramid” organizational structure. A consequence of 
this is that “any co-op that does not find that the Mondragon corporate offices are adding 
value to their operations may secede at any time” (Smith 2001, 13, 46). 
In such an inverted pyramidal structure, the principle of “Co-operation among Co-
operatives”, named as “inter-cooperation” in Mondragon cooperatives, is key to understand 
the long-term survival of Mondragon cooperatives. The freedom of each individual 
cooperative to leave the group means that the shared R&D, educational, financial and 
commercial services generate added value to the individual cooperatives. Otherwise, the 
constituent companies might leave, as happened in 2008 with Irizar and Ampo cooperatives, 
voting in their general assemblies to leave Mondragon Corporation (Basterretxea, 2011). The 
fact that the bulk of its cooperatives remained in the group for decades is a clear evidence that 
the incentives achieved through inter-cooperation do add important value (Smith 2001; 
Basterretxea, 2011)  
The manifestations of the Mondragon inter-cooperation principle bring both sacrifices and 
advantages to participants that go beyond the sharing of information at low implication or 
cost, as theorized for indirect ties in a network (Ahuja 2001). These include: (1) the 
establishment of a homogenous social and occupational system; (2) the shared restructuring 
of part of the profits (or losses) at sectoral division level and corporate level; (3) the 
regulation of the transference of worker members from cooperatives in crisis to those in need 
of workers; (4) the search for potential technological or commercial synergies; (5) benefits 
from many joint support institutions aimed to achieve collaborative advantages that include a 
credit union (Laboral Kutxa), corporate training centers (like Mondragon University), and 
corporate shared R&D units, or (6) the formation into intermediary-level networks of 
cooperatives, with agreements of strategic and economic cooperation that may be stronger 
than the general ones in Mondragon Corporation. Still, each cooperative retains freedom to 
abandon the group.   
In relation with the corporate shared technology centers and R&D units, in 2017 fifteen 
member firms from the Mondragon cooperatives were active, employing a total of 1,928 
researchers. Shared R&D units are second order cooperatives, namely, a modality of 
cooperative holding with two types of owners: its employees and cooperatives acting as joint 
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founders, and which are owners and customers of it (Irizar and McLeod, 2008). Most of those 
shared R&D units are specialized in specific industries and technologies and are the fruit of 
cooperation for innovation of cooperatives sharing similar or complementary products and 
frequently oriented to the same customers. In essence, fruit of coopetition. 
The study of coopetitive R&D through shared R&D units in Mondragon MT firms can be 
useful for other firms aiming to share R&D efforts with competitors. The Mondragon MT 
worker-cooperatives have created their own shared R&D units: Ideko and Koniker. Ideko is a 
research center specialized in industrial production and manufacturing technology. It was 
created in 1986. It employs 102 researchers and the largest part of its R&D activity consists 
in providing R&D to the metal cutting MT worker-cooperatives of Mondragon. In 2016 it 
had total sales of 9.5 million € in 2016, 48% of them coming from local, Spanish or European 
research funds.  
Koniker is a shared R&D unit specialized in the field of forming and assembly created in 
2002. It employed 26 researchers in 2016 and its services are shared by a group of worker-
cooperatives producing mainly stamping dies and automotive systems for big car 
manufacturers.  
In the area of internationalization, attempts to achieve synergies through joint marketing and 
sales efforts have also been much more successful among Mondragon cooperative MT firms 
(Otero, 2010, 136). Thus, the study of coopetitive internationalization experiences of 
cooperatives can be valuable for other firms willing to jointly interact with new customers of 
distant markets. 
Often, a decision into cooperation despite competition comes as result of the influencing 
demands from a common customer, actively creating interdependencies between two 
competing suppliers in a sort of triad (Dubois and Fredrikson 2008), a common outcome in 
supply chain management.  
These advantages can make us conjecture that benefits stemming from network membership 
may outweigh the potential risks derived from closeness to a direct competitor that is also a 
member of the same network. In addition, these advantages can be combined with the fact of 
sharing vision, values and, ultimately, trust. However, there is still research to do in the study 
of bottom-up processes of a firm’s aspiration for coopetition, affecting higher (namely, 
network) levels of coopetition, or conversely, of top-down processes, for which a proper 
contextual environment, containing a larger network and inter-network levels, aimed at 
propitiating cooperation among some of its constituent firms, exists (Bengtsson and Raza-
Ullah 2016). These contexts correspond more particularly to the case of the above described 
reality from Mondragon MT firms. Hence, our last research proposition: 
 
RP5: Common membership to a network should be perceived as favourable feature for a 
coopetitive relationship by competing firm members. 
 
 
3.- Methodology  
In this study we have used a qualitative approach by means of a cross-case analysis (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002), involving 14 organizations in the Spanish MT industry. In 
the literature reviews on coopetition, Bouncken et al. (2015) highlight that given the complex 
nature of coopetition and its nascent theoretical understanding, many researchers have opted 
for qualitative approaches, as it allows an in-depth understanding of the research objectives. 
The need to explore and describe one field- in our case, coopetition- makes in-depth 
qualitative analysis adequate (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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A first interview was completed with the CEO of the Spanish Association of Machine-Tool 
Producers. Besides providing an overview of open innovation practices in the MT industry, 
he also offered valuable information on some of the most innovative firms in the industry and 
the names of two key informants per firm. Eleven interviews were conducted with CEOs and 
Research and Development (R&D) managers of Spanish machine-tool producing SMEs, 
eight of which were worker-cooperatives. Two additional interviews were conducted with the 
heads of R&D of two research units shared among a number of worker-cooperatives, some of 
whom we study here. There are three interviews with managers of investor-owned MT firms.  
Table 1. Summary data of interviewed managers and firms. 
 
Unit No Kind of firm 
Member of 
Mondragon 
Group 
Sales turnover 
31/12/2015(€) 
Employees 
2015 Interviewee 
Cooperati
ves 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Co-Op Y 188,441,826 569 CEO(**)(1) 
2 Co-Op Y 140,654,000 436 Head of R&D 
3 Co-Op Y 66,736,853 230 CEO 
4 Co-Op Y 47,709,013 370 Member of R&D 
5 Co-Op N 38,073,000 160 CEO 
6 Co-Op Y Merged with another 
coop in 2013 50 CEO 
7 Co-Op Y 65,000,000 400 Head of R&D(*) 
8 Co-Op Y 230,000,000 1,500 Former Head 
of R&D(*) 
9 
Co-op 
Shared R&D 
unit 
Y 
8,769,742 92 CEO 
10 
Co-op 
Shared R&D 
Unit 
Y 
1,473,752 30 
CEO 
CEO(*)(1) 
 
11 
MT 
Producers' 
Association 
-- 
--- 
170 
corporations CEO 
Investor 
owned 
firms 
12 
Public 
Limited 
Company 
N 
72,342,000 146 Head of Innovation 
13 
Public 
Limited 
Company 
N 
46,064,000 233 Sales Director 
14 
Public 
Limited 
Company 
N 
35,773,518 118 CEO 
(*)Interviewed in June-July 2018; (**) Re-interviewed in June-July 2018 
(1)Both positions correspond to the same person  
Interviews focused on the open innovation processes and practices by the firms, with special 
emphasis on their collaborative innovation with customers and competitors. We followed a 
common interview guide, with few additional questions asked in the cooperative firms in 
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order to know how the inter-cooperation principle was implemented and to evaluate if it 
generated a more effective coopetition. Nevertheless, the interview process was flexible. As 
Bryman and Bell (2015) suggest, going off at tangents was often encouraged and many of our 
findings do not respond to questions that were prepared in advance by the interviewers. 
Significant non predicted issues emerged in the course of the interviews –as the coopetitive 
internationalization strategy of worker-cooperatives- and the emphases in the research was 
adjusted as a result of what interviewees saw as relevant and important. 
In order to gain the participants' trust and avoid organizational silence and social desirability 
bias, respondents' anonymity and the confidentiality of all information obtained were 
guaranteed.  
The interviews were recorded and transcribed, and subsequently analyzed by the three 
researchers, grouping and coding the transcriptions by themes and nodes of analysis. The 
three authors conducted the iterative process of data categorization and interpretation. This 
process applied to the semi-structured interviews made it possible to identify passages that 
illustrate the main themes emerging from the category analysis. 
As table 1 shows, cooperatives of our sample are on average larger than investor owned 
firms. The sample reflects the reality of the Spanish MT industry (see Otero, 2010). Initial 
interviews took place in 2013 and 2014. Between 2013 and 2017 the interviewed managers 
have been contacted in different moments to provide them feed-back of partial research 
findings. In order to increase the credibility of our analysis through respondent validation 
(Bryman and Bell, 2015), a review of drafts of the paper was also offered to and made by 
interviewees between November and December 2017.  
Finally, during June and July 2018, three more interviews were added in order to trace the 
outcome of cooperative R&D and shared R&D units, as important changes took place in 
some of the organizations initially studied in 2013 and 2014.   
 
4.- Results 
The obtained results from the interviewed managers are here disposed in a decreasing order 
of benefits relative to the collaborative efforts or difficulty, as perceived from interviewees. 
Accordingly, there are four realms: (1) shared R&D units, (2) coopetitive sales and after-sale 
services; (3) coopetitive efforts on behalf of common customers or with investor-owned 
firms, and (4) mergers and other organizational changes. In each of these four sections, we 
will expose the apparent relationship between the responses of the interviewees and the 
research propositions formulated. 
4.1.- Benefits from shared R&D units 
Cooperatives pool their resources and capabilities to pursue common long term research 
projects, mainly through the creation and co-funding of shared R&D units. Small worker-
cooperatives consider that it could be impossible to take part in ambitious and uncertain R&D 
activities if it were not for joint R&D budgets and shared R&D units: 
We are a small cooperative, with only fifty people, and we could not do many 
great things only relying on our own means. But with the sum of all the 
cooperatives, we can have a very decent R&D budget. "(Unit #6)  
Collaborating with the same partners over time may provide mainly redundant information 
and could result in inertia (Nieto and Santamaria 2007). Given that most of the innovation in 
the MT industry is incremental, repetitive collaboration with the same competitors was not 
seen as a problem. For more demanding innovation and R&D projects, firms should search 
novel ideas also outside the coopetition partners’ organizations (Ritala and 
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Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen, 2013), something MT worker-cooperatives do collaborating 
occasionally with other knowledge providers outside the cooperative network.  
Shared R&D units also take part as bridges to contact other bigger international R&D units, 
and help to complement R&D budgets of the worker-cooperatives with public R&D funding 
through European or local research funds and projects that are synergic with research needs 
of the MT worker-cooperatives.  
"Unit #9 works in certain lines of research in accordance with the businesses of 
the firms that co-own Unit #9, which are mainly cooperatives. We define the lines 
of research and we launch R&D projects that are led by Unit #9, but in which 
people from the cooperatives also take part. The idea is that these projects get 
public funding, from European funds, from the Spanish Ministry of Science, from 
the Basque Government, or from whatever. Besides, Unit #9 also provides us with 
applied research under contract. That is, tailored R&D services paid by the 
companies and conducted by Unit #9 ". (Unit #3) 
Researchers of the shared R&D units often work in inter-organizational teams, with 
technicians and researchers of each individual cooperative. Evidence from our interviews 
suggests that knowledge exchange and creation are favoured by temporary and permanent 
relocations of researchers of the shared R&D units in the MT worker-cooperatives, and vice 
versa. Relocations of researchers are of particular importance when those employees and the 
cooperatives they come from have complementary skills and expertise. This allows to 
combine the strengths of the different cooperatives, create synergies and engage in co-
development of new products.  
"When we are developing new products, it is a good thing to have both people 
from the firms and from the shared R&D unit intervening. Both have their input. I 
think it's good that they are not isolated. Then, there are also several technical 
directors in the cooperatives that are former researchers of the shared R&D unit 
#9." (Unit #2) 
 
 
RP4a evidenced: working cooperatives with limitations for R&D (size or limited 
resources) have a strong incentive to collaborate with a competitor, sharing R&D and 
resources. 
 
Some MT worker-cooperatives follow a prospective strategy, striving to be first movers in 
their market niches. Thus, they see co-opetition as a way to create, maintain and enhance 
their competitive advantage. Shared R&D units get specialized in long term R&D, allowing 
worker-cooperatives pursuing a prospective strategy to be ready when radical innovations or 
technological leaps occur in the industry (or in the industries of their main users) and get first 
mover advantages.  
“We think that within five or six years our users will replace metal parts with 
composites or reinforced plastics, and that this will affect the manufacture of our 
presses. Thus, we ask our shared R&D unit, Unit #10, to do research in this field, 
so when that technology is a reality, we are prepared. We did something similar a 
few years ago with the Press Hardening process and we were prepared when that 
process was incorporated into automobile manufacturing. When a technological 
leap occurs, being the first implementing the new technology is very important.” 
(Unit #6) 
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RP2a evidenced: Working cooperatives, which perceive that they can absorb 
knowledge from external sources, tend to have a greater propensity to coopete. 
 
Besides relying on shared R&D units for the long-term research and development activities, 
cooperative MT builders also have a large part of their own working force and budgets 
devoted to short term development in their internal R&D units and Technical Development 
Offices.  
 
"We are 230 people. In 2000 we had 26 people in the technical office, 47 in 2008, 
and 55 in 2012. We also have an internal R&D team consisting of 9 people. 
Innovation in specific short-term projects is made with internal R&D. For long-
term innovation and basic research, we rely in our shared R&D Unit #9. "(Unit 
#3) 
RP4b evidenced in an opposite way: No retrieval from shared R&D as consequence of being 
strong. Rather, many strong cooperatives participate in shared R&D activities, as a plus in 
their overall R&D activity. 
Knowledge transfer is also favoured through the assistance of managers of some cooperatives 
to the boards of directors of other cooperatives (Otero 2010). In our interviews, we found that 
management knowledge is also shared via relocations of managers. In fact, some of our 
interviewees told us that even if they were occupying management positions in one 
cooperative of the group, they were really members of another cooperative who had been 
temporarily relocated. 
Regular inter-cooperative ties, as relocations of technicians and managers, and the routinized 
creation of joint R&D teams, are measures allowing cooperatives to exchange complex tacit 
knowledge through direct person-to-person interactions, something that is of key importance 
(Hansen et. al., 1999).   
Interviewed managers in cooperatives identify the cooperative model as one that provides the 
potential for gaining competitive advantages through inter-cooperation, yet they stress that 
this potential is only converted into real advantages if managers actively promote it.  
According to our respondents, the increasing numbers of joint research teams, relocation of 
technicians, and knowledge transfer responds to a deliberate institutionalized strategy:  
"Now there is a trend (of joint R&D, knowledge exchange, transference of 
technicians…), because inter-cooperation is one of the most important 
cooperative strategies. What advantage do we, cooperatives, have to compete in 
the world? Well, we have more labour flexibility to face crisis, if we need to lower 
our salaries, we have flexibility. But what other value do we have? That we 
collaborate with other cooperatives, and this collaboration can give us a certain 
strength, right? And through inter-cooperation many opportunities may arise. 
Inter-cooperation is something that is being promoted. We want to structure it 
even more and do things of greater scope. " (Unit #1) 
RP5 evidenced: Common membership to a network (Mondragon Corporation) is perceived 
as favourable for coopetition. 
 
Notwithstanding these advantages, some working cooperatives who are members to 
Mondragon Corporation and to the R&D cooperative may perceive the need to ponder the 
decision to continue commissioning R&D services against developing research on their own. 
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“We have a [member] co-op that had only a technical development office serving 
directly its customer orders, and between a technical office and us, there is a 
clear difference in the roles. But, as they started to see us a bit far from their 
needs, they have been developing a R&D department on their own…and I…don’t 
see it [right] ‘cause it’s not in the terms we initially defined” (Unit #10)  
RP2c evidenced: An agent’s propensity to coopete will decrease if it perceives that it can 
concentrate its own capabilities to generate relevant knowledge individually. 
 
Some cooperatives and many investor-owned firms are reluctant to collaborate with 
sectoral R&D created by the cooperatives, since they fear that some knowledge will 
spill over through the R&D center. 
“[On the imagined fears from some cooperative member of the R&D unit, whose 
name was not revealed to us:]’The knowledge these people are gaining from us, 
they may use it…not even with a competitor, but with any of those cooperatives 
that may at some time enter the Tool sector’” (Unit #10)    
RP1b evidenced: Risk aversion to the diffusion of an externally produced knowledge restrains 
firms from taking part in coopetitive initiatives. 
 
There is, therefore, an “invisible division” between cooperatives and investor-owned firms 
regarding collaboration with R&D centers, according to Otero (2010). Our findings also 
support the existence of this “invisible division”. Even if cooperatives have tried to open the 
services of their shared R&D center to other MT firms, results have been modest. 
“We try to set the next goal to our shared R&D unit: conduct 50% of your R&D 
activity for us, and 50% for other firms not belonging to Mondragon 
Corporation. But there’s no way.” (Unit #3) 
 
While investor owned firms rely on sectoral R&D platforms just as providers of tailored 
R&D services, the kind of collaboration of MT worker-cooperatives with these platforms is 
much more intense. Besides providing R&D services, they provide technological surveillance 
and collaborate in the long-term innovation and technology planning and in the strategic 
planning of worker-cooperatives.  
“We have a strategic innovation unit. We not only provide technology, but also 
support in the identification of the most strategic part[...] That is, we provide 
three packages: competitive intelligence, strategy support and technological 
support. " (Unit #9) 
RP3 evidenced:The higher distance in the dominant logic between competing agents, the 
higher the intrusion of the competitive issues into a cooperative relationship.  
 
4.2.- Benefits of coopetitive sales and after-sale services in new markets   
As other European MT firms, the biggest MT builders in our sample have created 
subsidiaries in Asia to produce high volumes of low/mid-range machines at low costs but 
with high quality enabled by European expertise.  
As mentioned in the literature framework, European MT SMEs are facing significant 
challenges due to the growing importance of Asian and BRIC markets, where most of the 
MTs are now sold. Some interviewees highlighted that some of their European competitors 
have gone bankrupt despite having good products, just because they were not able to provide 
proper sales and after-sale services to users in a growing number of distant countries. Again, 
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coopetition has been the way Mondragon MT worker-cooperatives have used to solve this 
problem, through the creation of joint sales and after-sale services in distant growing markets. 
Sharing sales and after-sale services allow worker-cooperatives to have a direct contact with 
customers all over the world. Given that customers are the main source of innovation in the 
MT industry, this direct contact is highly valued by the interviewees from an innovation point 
of view. Besides, interviewed managers highlight that shared sales and after-sale services 
allow a better adaptation to different geographic and sectoral requirements, and also make it 
possible to achieve competitive advantages due to a better, faster and more flexible after-sale 
service.  
"We are a small cooperative, with 50 employees and we have 1,400 machines 
working all over the world. If we worked as an isolated company, it would be 
total madness to provide post-sale, repair and launch assistance services all over 
the world. We can do it because we have the support of the corporation and 
because we work together with the XXXX cooperative, which is a company that 
has a factory in China and has many commercial branches, and we share those 
services" (Unit #6) 
RP4a evidenced: Working cooperatives with limitations for sales and after-sales (size or 
limited resources) have a strong incentive to collaborate with a competitor, sharing sales 
services. 
RP5 evidenced: Common membership to a network (Mondragon Corporation) is perceived 
as favourable for coopetition. 
 
4.3 Coopetition on behalf of common customers or with investor-owned firms   
One of the studied cooperatives (Unit #5) does not belong to the Mondragon corporation, and 
according to our informant in this firm, coopetition with Mondragon firms in R&D has not 
been possible despite repeated efforts. As in other divisions of Mondragon, cooperatives in 
the MT division have to share between 15% and 40% of their profits (or losses) with other 
cooperatives of the division. The shared restructuring of profits at the level of sectoral 
division, the shared investments made during many years in joint R&D units and joint inter-
cooperation structures, and the internal regulation of relocations of members, are all factors 
that increase mutual trust and reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour associated to 
coopetition. Investor-owned firms willing to imitate the coopetitive strategy of cooperatives, 
should previously generate mutual bonds that mitigate the threat of opportunistic behaviour 
(creating joint ventures, as opposed to non-equity alliances, with detailed collaboration 
contracts, for example). In fact, in Spain only four small investor-owned firms in the MT 
industry, not competing in the same product range and employing 270 people in total, have 
managed to create a joint venture to jointly market and promote their products (Otero, 2010, 
136). In the absence of those mutual bonds, coopetitive strategies are hard to imitate by other 
firms, according to our interviewees.   
"If firms do not have other kinds of previous relationship, if they do not share 
other things as we do [in relation to the sharing of profits and losses of 
Mondragon cooperatives, shared structures, shared culture and values...], creating 
joint sales and after-sale services is very difficult. In order to provide after-sale 
services of each machine, you need to devote time and efforts to learn and 
acquire knowledge, and firms are very jealous of their product and don’t want to 
show their knowledge to competitors. If you open the maintenance service of your 
machine to your competitors, you open everything to them. And of course, it is 
very complicated to reach a joint service agreement with a competing firm. It is 
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very difficult to compete in products and at the same time cooperate in the 
provision of sales or after-sale services." (Unit #9)  
Supporting the findings of the literature on coopetition, the investor-owned firms that engage 
in co-opetition limit it mainly to activities that are far away from the customer. Cooperation 
takes place up to certain point, in which it is confronted to fierce competition. According to 
our interviewees in investor owned firms, coopetition is not possible on activities that are 
close to the customer, as the joint sales and after-sale services provided by the cooperatives.  
"We have taken part in joint projects with competitors. The change [towards 
higher cooperation with competitors] is a change that has to be made if we want 
to get larger projects from clients. I think it will be determinant that at least we 
are able to talk to our competitors [to explore joint offers].[...] I’m competing 
fiercely against those firms to get customers, but at the same time I have the 
mobile phone of the technical director of X, Y and Z firms and when there is a 
project that theoretically does not affect an ongoing project or deal with a 
customer, we talk. When we’re in a project or deal with a customer, we do not 
talk. That is obvious, every firm here takes care of its business." (Unit #14)  
When asked about other international successful coopetition experiences in the MT industry, 
interviewed managers did not mention cases of small and medium-sized family-owned firms, 
but cases of large corporations, in which achieving mutually beneficial arrangements can be 
perhaps easier and less influenced by passions than in rival family firms.   
 
RP1a evidenced: Risk aversion to the opportunistic transmission of own knowledge restrains 
from taking part in coopetitive initiatives. 
RP5 evidenced: Common membership to a network (Mondragon Corporation) is perceived 
as favourable for coopetition. 
However, some of the interviewees in investor owned MT firms consider that environmental 
changes make it increasingly necessary to engage in coopetition and affirm that they are 
gradually intensifying their collaboration with competitors. Those increasing industry 
coopetition experiences include both cooperatives and investor-owned firms at the cutting 
edge in innovation and technology. Those firms have a positive perception of their own lead 
time, and are less afraid of imitation and of co-opetition.  
“We recently went to visit the factory of one investor owned competitor, Z, and 
we had a meeting there and we saw their technology. Later on, Z technicians 
came here to visit us. We have also conducted open-door days with other investor 
owned competitors as W. The difference doesn’t rest on hiding our capabilities; 
the difference is in having more capabilities than the others.” (Unit #2)  
Also, some of the interviewed cooperatives have been able to replicate their experience with 
investor owned competing firms. In those cases, cooperation has been achieved at the 
expense of strict competition, taking measures to avoid direct competition and possible 
opportunistic behavior of other competitors. 
Currently we have a process of cooperation with three Italian competitors in the 
line of machinery and installations for appliance companies. None of the 4 
companies is able to individually meet the requirements of large appliance 
manufacturers such as Bosch or Whirpool. In order to create this alliance, 
previously each company has had to carry out a cleaning of products of its range 
so that there is no internal competition between the four companies and to 
generate trust between them. We are building a shared joint commercial network” 
(Unit #1) 
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RP2b evidenced: An agent’s propensity to coopete will increase if it perceives that it can 
protect its own knowledge from competitors.  
RP4a evidenced: Vulnerable a firm is in terms of size or limited resources, tend to be more 
willing to collaborate with a competitor.  
 
4.4.- Mergers and other organizational changes generated from coopetition 
Since the first MT worker cooperatives of the Mondragon group were created (Danobat in 
1954, Goiti in 1961 and Soraluce in 1962), they have experienced periods of intense 
competition, followed by periods of competition and cooperation. During the first decades, 
different MT manufacturers competed among them offering the same products to the same 
clients, without sharing any knowledge, and developing similar products and technologies in 
parallel.  
Since the mid-1980s, and more clearly since 1991, the year in which the Mondragon 
cooperatives were grouped into sectoral divisions, there was a process of increasing 
cooperation at the expense of competition. These competing MT cooperatives initiated a 
redistribution of the products manufactured by each, towards a greater specialization. In this 
way, companies that had been competitors gradually became complementary, reducing 
competitive tensions and facilitating cooperation. In some cases, the solution was the division 
of markets. Thus, the competition that occurred between Danobat (included in this sample) 
and Lealde (not included) in the case of lathes was resolved by assigning the automotive 
market to Danobat and the equipment goods market to Lealde. In some cases cooperatives 
competing frontally in some project, for example Danobat and Soraluce (included) in special 
machines and transfer lines, chose to create a joint company (named D + S) onto which to 
assign these. 
RP2b evidenced: An agent’s propensity to coopete will increase if it perceives that it can 
protect its own knowledge from competitors.  
RP5 evidenced: Common membership to a network (Mondragon Corporation) is perceived 
as favourable for coopetition. 
Nevertheless, this process of converting competing firms in complementary firms that 
cooperate is not always followed, since market forces and customers sometimes make it 
impossible.  
“Unit #7 and Unit #8 are cooperatives for which specializing into a product and 
dividing products up theoretically is easy, but the market does not respond to this 
and forces you to expand your products and to compete. Product positioning is 
not a business decision, because if you position yourself in a product, the market 
does not respond… Our option to offer more products is to survive; it is pure 
survival.” (Unit #7). 
 
Consequently, some directly competing Mondragon MT worker-cooperatives have opted for 
not strong ties or bonds for cooperation, maintaining their own autonomy. Some of these 
structures created for inter-cooperation are the “mutual interest groups”: 
“There are some teamwork practices of technicians from different cooperatives 
that are even regulated and that we call "Mutual interest groups". In order to 
create a mutual interest group with, let’s say, two cooperatives, there has to be a 
prior interest in both cooperatives. Each cooperative has to gain something from 
that collaboration, otherwise there is no agreement. Nevertheless, what I do want 
to stress is that all those mutual interest groups are facilitated by the fact of 
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belonging to Mondragon Corporation. Mondragon boosts and helps inter-
cooperation without any doubt." (Unit #9) 
 
Mutual interest groups, often involve simultaneous cooperation and direct competition. In 
those cases cooperation can be highly heterogeneous in time, activities, markets and products. 
Despite an official discourse that stresses cooperation and defines the cooperatives as “cousin 
firms”, direct competition often creates many difficulties to cooperation in sales, buys, joint 
R&D, knowledge exchange, or transference of technicians. Thus, those cooperatives can be 
sharing R&D units and projects during some periods if they consider that the advantages of 
cooperating with competitors are higher than the downsides; and change their mind in other 
periods.  
"Since 2006 Unit #7 and Unit #8 cooperate in joint purchases achieving lower 
prices from providers. In R & D they began to jointly conduct technological and 
market prospection. They started doing joint R&D projects together that were 
going very well, but … frictions began when the joint R&D projects concluded. 
There was a business and market opportunity and it was necessary to decide how 
to divide up the business, who was present in them and who was leading them.  
In 2009, the collaboration in R & D broke, with each one tired of the other for 
different reasons, so a distribution was decided, and some products, technologies 
and sectors were separated, and each one followed its own R&D and 
technological surveillance, in the same way as with new projects. Both Unit #7 
and Unit #8 reached to the conclusion that R & D projects have to be led by each 
company alone.” (Unit #7) 
In another example of shared R&D units, seven worker cooperatives (Fagor Arrasate, Ona-
Press, Mondragon Assembly, Batz, Matrici, Loramendi and Aurrenak), producing mainly 
stamping systems and special machines for big car manufacturers, shared the same R&D unit 
for more than ten years. Our first interviews, in 2013, showed that some of those firms with 
high levels of complementarity valued highly the shared R&D unit and sharing knowledge 
among them. On the contrary, worker cooperatives with high levels of direct competition had 
a much variable and cautious approach to cooperation in R&D and sharing the same R&D 
unit with their competitors. In fact, in 2015 four of those cooperatives (Batz, Matrici, 
Loramendi and Aurrenak) decided to leave the shared R&D unit (Unit #10). Tensions created 
by direct competition, and changes in key management and R&D units were mentioned as 
causes to give up the coopetitive R&D approach: 
 "There are companies that think they can go off the rails of innovation with the 
shared R & D center, and that fear of knowledge this R&D center acquires from 
them reverting to the cooperative with which they compete" (Unit # 10) 
 
According to interviewees, coopetition is easier when cooperatives are facing extreme market 
environments. During the years where the crisis affected the industry more severely (2007, 
2008, 2009) competing firms cooperated strongly in R&D in order to survive. Cooperation 
also gains momentum when market conditions are very good and individual worker 
cooperatives are not able to attend market needs individually. In these cases, cooperatives can 
be fiercely competing for some customers, while cooperating to get big contracts with other 
customers that could not be achieved in a solo way (Dubois and Fredrikson 2008). The case 
of Unit #7 and Unit #8 serves to add light to the cooperation-competition see-saw. In 2017, 
while they were directly competing for many car manufacturers with similar products, Unit 
#7 achieved its biggest historical contract with a multinational trucks company in cooperation 
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with Unit #8. In any case, despite tensions created by direct competition, coopeting worker 
cooperatives highlight that cooperation is much easier among them than with other competing 
firms.  
 
“The greatest cooperation [efforts] I've seen between Unit #7 and Unit #8 take 
place when there is a need. When there has been no work or when there is a lot. A 
scenario is when there is a lot of work and a cooperative can not attend to all that 
work alone and asks for the cooperation of the other. Another scenario is when 
there is no work for anyone, as between 2006 and 2008; at that time they 
collaborated a lot. It was the moment in which much work was done in 
collaboration with R&D and purchases. When you are in intermediate market 
situations, cooperation is more complex, because you get work, but you need 
more, then you compete in what is out there.” (Unit #7) 
 
RP1b evidenced: Risk aversion to the diffusion of an externally produced knowledge restrains 
firms from taking part in coopetitive initiatives. 
RP3 evidenced: The higher distance in the dominant logic between competing agents, the 
higher the intrusion of the competitive issues into an cooperative relationship.  
RP4a evidenced: Working cooperatives vulnerable in terms of size or limited resources have 
a strong incentive to collaborate with a competitor. 
RP4b evidenced: Working cooperatives non-vulnerable in terms of size or limited resources 
do not tend to take part in collaboration schemes with competitors. 
RP5 evidenced: Common membership to a network (Mondragon Corporation) is perceived 
as favourable for coopetition. 
 
Some worker-cooperatives with strong and long-lasting dyadic coopetition paths, offering 
similar or complementary products and targeting similar or even the same customers, have 
made the final decision of merging. Different major merges have taken place among Spanish 
MT worker-cooperatives in the last decade. In 2008 Danobat and Lealde merged to provide 
complete turning solutions. In 2011 the cooperative Estarta was integrated into the Danobat 
cooperative group. Before the integration, both firms had been directly competitors producing 
grinding machines and at the same time cooperating in the Danobat Group; in 2013 Fagor 
Arrasate and Onapres (both included in our sample) also merged after 15 years of cooperation 
in the commercialization of their forming machine-tools; the same year Doiki and Goimek 
(not included) already coopeting in the offer of precision machining merged; and in 2017 
Soraluce and Danobat Railway also merged.  
The reasons for these mergers were that they improve competitiveness in the global market 
and help to transmit a unified vision to the clients and the market, moving away from being a 
group made up of several brands. To a great extent, those worker-cooperatives renounce to 
overcome their smallness through coopetition, eliminating the competitive side of the 
equation through mergers and integrations. 
“We have gone from thirteen companies to nine in three years. We have 
reabsorbed and integrated, because in a globalized world you need a certain 
dimension. In fact, we are going to continue this process, and we want to go 
from being nine companies to five.” (Unit #2)  
RP4a evidenced: Working cooperatives vulnerable in terms of size or limited resources have 
a strong incentive collaborate with a competitor. 
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RP3 evidenced: The higher distance in the dominant logic between competing agents, the 
higher the intrusion of the competitive issues into an cooperative relationship.  
 
A summary of the main findings from our research is presented in table 2.   
 
Table 2.-Main categories and findings of the research. 
 Benefits Research Propositions involved 
Benefits of coopetitive 
R&D and shared R&D  
units 
Synergies, economies of scale and reduced 
R&D risks and costs  
First mover advantages 
Obtaining public funding for R&D 
Shared R&D units as bridges to international 
R&D providers 
Knowledge exchange through relocations of 
researchers and joint R&D teams 
Collaboration in Strategic Planning 
RP1b  
RP2a  
RP2c  
RP3  
RP4a  
RP4b (evidenced in an opposite 
way) 
RP5  
Benefits of coopetitive 
sales and after-sale 
services in new markets 
Synergies, economies of scale and reduced 
internationalization risks and costs 
Direct contact and knowledge exchange with 
customers in distant countries 
Faster and more flexible sales and after-sale 
services 
RP4a  
RP5  
 
Coopetition on behalf 
of common customers 
or with investor-owned 
firms 
Barriers to replicate cooperative coopetition in 
activities close to the customer 
Coopetitive initiatives in investor owned firms 
easier in activities far from the customer 
RP1a  
RP2b   
RP3  
RP5  
 
Mergers and other 
organizational changes 
Mergers 
Mutual Interest Groups 
RP1b  
RP2b  
RP3  
RP4a  
RP4b (partly)  
RP4b (partly)  
RP5  
 
  
 
5.- Conclusions  
The main benefits that MT cooperatives obtain from the implementation of cooperative 
initiatives are oriented towards sharing costs, increasing capacity, reaching economies of 
scale, reducing certain risks and obtaining access to knowledge and other resources. These 
resources turn out to be necessary to create, maintain and enhance their competitive edge and 
get first mover advantages. 
Coopetition among these organizations takes place mainly in the R & D areas (shared R & D 
units, projects and budgets, joint R & D teams, and regular relocations of technicians and 
managers), in sales (joint sales and after-sale services, to overcome their size limitations and 
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have access to users in growing distant markets), and in purchases (mostly joint purchases, to 
benefit from better prices). 
This cooperation is initiated and materialized through collaboration agreements between 
cooperatives, which may evolve towards mutual interest groups, and may become formalized 
in the form of second level cooperatives (i.e., cooperatives made from cooperatives) and, 
ultimately, in the form of mergers of cooperatives. 
In the beginning of a collaborative relationship, the main condition is the occurrence of a 
common need, such as the following: (1) limited resources to deal with innovation projects 
individually, (2) the need to reach new clients, or (3) to form a solid after-sale service 
network, (4) a reorientation of the target market strategy, (5) a reorientation of the strategic 
management, or (6) the need to attend strong increases from the demand-side in terms of size, 
terms or complexity, among other. Additionally, other important conditions that are necessary 
for cooperation to succeed are that the involved organizations must perceive they are capable 
of absorbing the new knowledge they will access. Secondly, they must have confidence on 
their capabilities for protecting their competitive knowledge. Finallyy, they have to become 
aware that generating the needed knowledge is out of reach, or that, in spite of being leading 
companies, they can produce better knowledge through collaborative agreements. 
The support and leadership of a favorable supraorganization, as is the case of Mondragon 
Corporation, together with the proximity in the competitive logic and dominant values 
existing among the cooperatives, are elements that facilitate, in turn, collaboration among 
competitors. 
Notably, the same as it happens with other types of organizations by juridical form, the main 
obstacle for collaborative agreements among cooperatives is their risk aversion to the 
opportunist transmission of own knowledge and to the diffusion to third parties of an 
externally produced knowledge.  
The cooperatives from the MT sector participating in coopetition initiatives have dealt with 
risk aversion by means of the following mechanisms: 
- Concrete measures to reduce the risk of opportunistic behavior, such as the prior 
redistribution of products and markets among competitors, or initiate cooperative 
activities in phases of the value chain that are away from the client. 
- Progressive generation of trust, through previous cooperative relations in activities 
less sensitive to opportunism. 
- Integration into a group (a second level cooperative group, or an interest group) 
within which collaborative behavior is assumed and engendered, in the form of 
sharing of profits and losses among cooperative member firms, movement of 
managers and intra-group workers, and the adoption of cooperative values, among 
other. In this environment, ethical and strategical leadership permeates the entire 
network. 
Additionally, our research findings suggest that replicating the coopetition strategy of 
cooperatives in other firms is only feasible in the presence of strong ties and bonds linking 
coopeting firms. Investor owned firms that have been successful replicating coopetitive 
strategies with worker cooperatives have also followed the path of changing their product 
offer, gradually becoming complementary firms. In highly innovative firms, each one being a 
leader of its respective market niche, and being confident in their possibilities of 
differentiation, coopetition can help them to accelerate this process.  
Notwithstanding these benefits, keeping intellectual property or any other key knowledge 
protected by means of patents or contracts, for example, or coopeting only in the case of 
projects that do not put distinctive key capabilities of the organization at risk, are also 
 21
conditions facilitating coopetition. Knowledge of these conditions evidenced from our 
research constitutes a guide to facilitate coopetition outside from the cooperative firms. 
However, difficulty of compliance limits our capability to generalize in theoretical terms. 
Finally, the main contributions of this work are that firstly, it enhances our understanding of 
coopetition, investigating cross-level interactions between coopetition in large networks 
(division, corporation, shared R&D units) and coopetition in a dyadic level. As Morris et al. 
(2007, 51) highlight, in order to achieve successful coopetitive relationships, “trust and 
commitment must be coupled with a clear sense that both parts actually benefit from the 
relationship”  
Secondly, our findings suggest that botton-up coopetition processes shape the nature of 
higher levels more effectively than viceversa. Also, it enriches the existing literature 
analyzing some organizational changes that take place when competing firms decide to 
cooperate in the long term. Lastly, our empirical study enriches the literature underlining how 
dyadic coopetition evolves depending on economic cycles. Cooperation gains momentum 
when market conditions are either extremely good (because firms are unable to respond to big 
customer needs in a solo way) or extremely bad (because firms have a higher chance of 
surviving cooperating in the search of new products and markets). During these good and bad 
periods, coopeting firms experiment a higher need of cooperation. On the contrary, in 
intermediate ordinary situations, competition is more powerful than cooperation. 
 
Our findings can also be valuable for regional policy makers trying to promote coopetition 
among key industries. Efforts to support coopetition should not be driven to a whole industry, 
but to those players with higher chances of benefiting from coopetition. Firms that are 
leading their market niches and are more confident in their possibilities of differentiating and 
protecting their innovation against imitation are the most favorable to take further steps on 
coopetition. These findings are coherent with previous research (Ritala and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2009). Trying to promote coopetition among follower firms that feel very 
vulnerable to imitation can be much less effective, since those firms do not buy the need and 
benefits of coopetition. Regional bodies supporting coopetition should also be aware of its 
risks, and primarily promote coopetition in activities that are far away from the customer. If 
public bodies want to support coopetition in activities close to the customer –as the shared 
sales and after-sale services of worker-cooperatives analyzed in the paper–, prior efforts will 
have to be done in order to increase mutual trust and commitment, promoting cross holding 
and equity based alliances, for instance. 
Finally, we must be aware of the main limitations of our research, derived from the use of a 
qualitative study focused on a single industry, as it happens with most previous research on 
coopetition. Given that our research focuses on the MT industry in Spain, obtained results are 
at least partly biased towards the characteristics of that industry. Extending this research into 
other industries, other geographical areas, or into the analysis of coopetition behaviour from 
other types of entities, - such as family-owned versus public limited companies, as Bouncken 
et al. 2015 suggest-, can be of interest to contrast and complete the conclusions obtained from 
this research. 
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